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1. INTRODUCTION  3 
Globally, state and private sector investments are intensifying the control, extraction and 4 
contestation over natural resources in ‘frontiers’. Frequently, frontiers are conceived of as 5 
discursively and materially produced spaces experiencing intense transitions, where 6 
seemingly remote regions are empty, yet full and ripe for the production and expansion of 7 
capital (Barney 2009; Moore 2015). Control and authority over resources in these spaces is 8 
redefined by those with power, with significant impacts and consequences for poor resource 9 
users and their environments (Rasmussen and Lund 2017). Yet much discussion concerning 10 
such frontiers has been about surplus land, the conversion of forest for timber, or landscapes 11 
being opened for minerals or sown for boom crops (Borras et al. 2011; Peluso and Lund 12 
2011; Fairhead et al. 2012). In effect, frontiers are often valorised as quintessential land-13 
based territories, where agrarian smallholders serve as symbolic markers of settler expansion, 14 
control, and productivity in the national interest. Much research in critical political ecology 15 
has followed suit, examining the political and economic factors of the production, 16 
contestation and transformation of frontiers (Peluso and Lund 2011; Fairhead et al 2012). 17 
However, much less research emphasis has been placed on how politically, economically and 18 
ecologically connected coastal regions are also undergoing intense and rapid transformations 19 
(Campling et al. 2012; Crona et al. 2016). In many respects, marine enclosures, extractive 20 
zones and commodities production are part of frontier transitions as much as boom crops are 21 
in the interior. Yet compared to the agrarian smallholder cousin, the poor coastal fisher is the 22 
less visible ‘surplus migrant’ arguably left out of the popular frontier imaginary. In the Asia-23 
Pacific, in particular, new economic powers such as China have increased demand for 24 
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imported seafood from across the region, including prawns, live reef food fish, tuna, shark fin 25 
and sea cucumber (Fougères 2008; Barclay 2010; ADB 2014; Eriksson et al. 2015). 26 
Aquaculture is growing rapidly (Belton & Thilsted 2014) and regional trade agreements drive 27 
further seafood trade (Gephart & Pace 2015). At the same time, governance trends such as 28 
certification and enclosures are intensifying (Segi 2014a; Foley and Havice 2016) under the 29 
theme of ‘blue growth’ (Barbesgaard 2016). 30 
In the context of commodity frontier analysis, however, further research into the social 31 
dynamics of fisheries trade is needed. While there is a considerable literature documenting 32 
the rapid expansion of seafood trade, the vast majority of this comes from the environmental 33 
or economic sciences. Much environmentally orientated literature tends to focus on 34 
measuring the impacts of fisheries trade on stocks (e.g. Cinner et al. 2013; Pauly & Zeller 35 
2016), highlighting the negative consequences for fishing livelihoods and sometimes 36 
subsequently calling for restricted fishing access rights (e.g. Vincent and Harris 2014). Other 37 
studies have used aggregated trade data to assess the range of costs and benefits of seafood 38 
trade for the coastal poor (e.g. Kurien 2005; Béné et al. 2010; Gephart & Pace 2015). Such 39 
macro-scale approaches have inherent limitations when addressing the highly differentiated 40 
outcomes for the coastal poor associated with expanding seafood trade. And although there is 41 
a large literature in maritime anthropology that examines access at a micro-scale in particular 42 
cases (e.g. Haller & Merten 2008; Coulthard 2011; Jentoft & Eide 2011; Knudsen 2016), 43 
these studies are rarely connected to the broader context of expanding commodities in coastal 44 
frontiers (Campling 2012). Political-economy orientated literature highlights the structural 45 
conditions underlying expanded seafood trade (e.g. Mansfield 2004; Campling 2012; Longo 46 
et al. 2015; Saguin 2015), but understandings of the socio-political substance of access 47 
dynamics in specific contexts and how these relate to expanding seafood trade remain limited 48 
(Crona et al. 2016). This paper thus further contributes to such understandings by asking how 49 
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social relations of ethnicity and class at the micro-scale affect access to the production of 50 
seafood, and how these social relations link with political-economic processes of migration 51 
and land-use change occurring at wider historical and geographical scales.   52 
In this paper, we take a scaled political ecology approach (Perreault et al. 2015) to examine 53 
how access unfolds at the ‘extractive ends’ of seafood trade in the coastal frontiers of 54 
Palawan province, the Philippines. We focus on the interrelations of two scales: ethnicity and 55 
class relations at the local scale, and geographic and historical contexts at the regional scale. 56 
As an archipelagic nation, the Philippines has high economic reliance on marine resources 57 
and high involvement in transnational seafood commodity chains. From the 1950s, Philippine 58 
fisheries underwent a massive expansion (Butcher 2004). Large numbers of people also 59 
moved to the coasts to fish for their livelihood in commercial and small-scale sectors, fuelling 60 
the country’s major fish export market (Seki 2004; Eder 2009; ADB 2014). Capture fisheries 61 
alone provide direct employment for at least 1.5 million people in the Philippines, and are 62 
worth at least USD2.5 billion annually (ADB 2014: 23-24). At the same time, fish stocks are 63 
declining, and the country’s fisheries are now considered to be in crisis (Muallil et al. 2014), 64 
putting significant stress on fishing livelihoods. As we show, other recent societal changes 65 
such as land-use intensification further pressure fishers in coastal areas. Access analysis is 66 
thus particularly important to understand the intersectional nature of these scales. 67 
We focus on the province of Palawan as a fast-filling maritime frontier space. While seafood 68 
commodities have long been internationally traded from Palawan, these connections have 69 
been magnified with the intensifying nature of globalisation. Since the 1950s, Palawan has 70 
been a prime target for migration, upland resource extraction and major expansion of 71 
commercial fishing enterprises (Butcher 2004; Eder and Evangelista 2014). Recently, it has 72 
also undergone growing investments in land and tourism. Migrant fisher populations from 73 
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other provinces and indigenous peoples co-exist in these rapidly changing areas, and now 74 
experience tourism expansion and palm oil production that claim peri-coastal lands, 75 
squeezing resident access to marine-based livelihoods. As multiple actors scramble to control 76 
and obtain value from both marine and terrestrial resources in this frontier zone (Rasmussen 77 
and Lund 2017), competition over progressively more scarce resources intensifies with 78 
strongly differentiated outcomes. In making the notion of access via social relations set in 79 
time and space explicit, the case of Palawan and San Vicente municipality highlights how 80 
access to fisheries trade is influenced by a complex set of challenges and opportunities 81 
situated at multiple scales. We illustrate how the value produced along these commodity 82 
chains is accessed and used according to rural actors’ ethnicity and class positioning over 83 
time and space.  84 
2. ACCESS DYNAMICS IN COASTAL FRONTIERS 85 
As with land-based frontiers, coastal frontiers are similarly discursive and material spaces 86 
undergoing rapid ‘maritime transitions’ (Fougères 2008; Belton and Thilsted 2016), 87 
exemplified by intensifying contestations over access to the production, exchange and use of 88 
highly-valued marine resource commodities. As emergent, highly politicized spaces, 89 
capitalist expansion and resource production run in parallel to, and are interconnected with, 90 
similar political and economic process of change in hinterland areas, where coastal land 91 
areas, near-shore and far-shore spaces are appropriated as enclosures for resource control and 92 
expansion (Pinkerton and Davis 2015; Saguin 2015). Yet the political ecology of such 93 
maritime transitions in coastal frontiers remains understudied, particularly concerning how 94 
coastal institutions, micro-politics, and economic change influence marine resource access 95 
and use over time and space.  96 
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Central to such analysis of how the institutions that govern marine resource access and use 97 
are re-defined is a scaled, critical understanding of how rural actors mediate the costs and 98 
benefits of rapidly growing seafood commodity chains in such frontiers. Our aim is to shift 99 
the focus from economic and environmental perspectives to a more critical social analysis on 100 
the access and use dynamics in seafood value chains in coastal frontiers undergoing rapid 101 
change. We draw explicitly on the concept of ‘access analysis’ to focus on how individuals or 102 
groups gain, control or maintain ‘the ability to benefit from things’ in coastal environments 103 
(Ribot 1998; Ribot & Peluso 2003). Ribot and Peluso (2003) defined nine ‘mechanisms’ of 104 
access to natural resources: rights-based, technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge, 105 
authority, identities, and social relations. Rather than drawing on Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) 106 
entire framework, we specifically engage how class and ethnic relations influence access 107 
dynamics at local and regional scales of analysis. We choose these aspects because they are 108 
most salient and consequential for the coastal poor on Palawan Island.  109 
Our emphasis on multiple scales aims to move beyond the existing methodological emphasis 110 
in the literature on seafood trade to focus either at the national or local level (Crona et al. 111 
2016: 1). In recognising that the concept of scale itself is not a pre-given, fixed entity, we 112 
align with others in highlighting the socially produced and politically contested nature of 113 
‘scale’ (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003; Neumann 2009). Long-standing work in political 114 
ecology has shown, for example, how how political economic structures and influences vary 115 
across scale and shape resource access and use, as well as ecological change (Paulson and 116 
Gezon 2005; Perreault et al. 2015). We emphasise how access dynamics are constituted by 117 
way of ethnicity and class through historical and contemporary processes interacting at 118 
multiple scales. At the local scale – roughly equivalent to a local village or community – 119 
social relations of class and ethnicity serve as important markers of difference that inform 120 
control over access to fisheries resources. Here we emphasise how poor fishers with 121 
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contrasting ethnicities, social histories and livelihoods actively work social relations to gain 122 
access to marine resources once out of reach. In this respect, how much a poor fisher invests 123 
in social relations matters as much as they invest in their livelihood portfolio and other 124 
natural resources (Berry 1989). At a regional scale–roughly equivalent to the province–125 
societal changes include patterns of land use change that shape the broader geographical 126 
context in coastal areas, and patterns of migration from across the country that form the 127 
historical context and ultimately, the contemporary dynamics in coastal Palawan.  128 
By extension, our analysis engages with recent accounts of ‘exclusion’ in the context of 129 
commodity expansion in Southeast Asia (Hall et al. 2011). Hall et al. develop four ‘powers of 130 
exclusion’ that affect access dynamics in rural contexts: regulation, force, the market, and 131 
legitimation. All four drive exclusion to affect access dynamics in varying degrees: the rules 132 
regarding access, threats to enforce those rules, costs steering access, and the socio-political 133 
basis of controlling access. Our use of the term ‘access dynamics’ thus encompasses both 134 
‘access mechanisms’ and ‘exclusion’. While not deterministic, these access dynamics heavily 135 
influence the extent to which fishers succeed in fisheries trade. Our argument is that an 136 
investigation of these access dynamics operating at multiple scales is crucial to understand 137 
the differentiated outcomes of fisheries trade for coastal residents.  138 
We examine how local social relations and broader societal changes affect access not in terms 139 
of ‘formal correlations’ (see Kurien 2005; Béné et al. 2010; Hicks & Cinner 2014) but in 140 
terms of direct and indirect influences from near and afar. Rather than looking for universal 141 
links between increased trade and livelihoods, we instead consider how different social 142 
groups engage in fisheries trade over time. This means examining how the poor engage in 143 
small-scale fishing practices at the nexus of local and regional processes, to encompass those 144 
distal pressures that are seemingly less relevant and visible (Coe et al. 2008). At the local 145 
scale, we focus on how fishers differentiated by class and ethnicity are able to engage in 146 
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fisheries trade over time. At the regional scale, we show how these engagements are shaped 147 
by broader historical and geographical contexts. 148 
3. METHODS 149 
This paper draws on fieldwork from 2014-2015 in the municipality of San Vicente, Palawan 150 
(Figure 1). As a municipality with multiple ethnic groups formed over a long history of 151 
migration, with multiple frontier processes (e.g. fisheries investments and trade, new fisheries 152 
regulations, tourism and coastal developments) currently unfolding, San Vicente represented 153 
an ideal location for our research as. In August 2014, we conducted 15 interviews in two 154 
communities, and three focus groups. The two communities were chosen as, taken together, 155 
they represented a socially and economically diverse set of coastal households in San 156 
Vicente. Because ethnicity was a focus of our analysis, focus groups were conducted with the 157 
major different (self-identified) ethnic groups resident in the area (Agutaynen and Cuyonon, 158 
Tagbanua, Visayan). These focus groups were held in public locations such as the basketball 159 
court, and discussion centred around community-scale histories of land-use change, 160 
migration, the historical development of the fishing economy, and ethnic patterns of resource 161 
use. In 2015, we conducted a further 34 interviews and 28 interviews with households in June 162 
and November, respectively. The topics for the interviews in 2015 focused on life histories of 163 
fishers and fishing households, possession of assets and livelihood strategies, and social 164 
differentiation within coastal communities. Income class was not explicitly considered in 165 
these interviews as a discrete variable; instead, class was described and observed through 166 
descriptions of experiences, household assets and fish catches. Interviews were conducted in 167 
Filipino, the lingua franca of each community. Informed consent was obtained from all 168 
interviewees, and interviews were conducted in the home of the interviewee. Interviewees 169 
were selected through stratified sampling to include households of different ethnicity, class, 170 
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and livelihood strategy (e.g. different types of fishing gears). Our main focus in using these 171 
methods is how access and use differentiates in terms of ethnicity and class relations.  172 
In addition to household interviews where we discussed the specific experiences and views of 173 
households, we also interviewed key informants such as older residents and government 174 
officials to obtain information on historical and other general trends occurring in each 175 
community and the municipality. Detailed fieldnotes were taken each day during fieldwork, 176 
and these fieldnotes were subsequently manually qualitatively analysed for key themes that 177 
emerged (Bernard, 2006). We use other published historical and ethnographic material from 178 
Palawan province (and around the country) to complement our analysis, reinforcing that the 179 
trends we discuss are becoming increasingly common. And while this analysis is primarily 180 
based on a discrete set of interviews in one municipality, it also builds on each author’s long-181 
term field experience in other parts of Palawan province (see, e.g. Pido 1995; Dressler 2009; 182 
Fabinyi 2012). 183 
4. REGIONAL SCALE 184 
Geography, history, and social context all converge to condition access to fisheries trade 185 
among the coastal poor on Palawan. This section outlines how migration, agrarian change 186 
and social relations have unfolded and changed over time at a regional scale in coastal 187 
Palawan, with reference to access to fisheries.  188 
4.1 Geographical and historical context 189 
Coastal Palawan has witnessed progressive settlement by different groups during the 20th 190 
century. Originally inhabited by Tagbanua (in the northern and central parts of the province), 191 
Batak (central), Pala’wan (central-southern parts), and Molbog, other ethno-linguistic groups 192 
settled along the coasts for economic opportunities (Eder 2009). The first ‘wave’ of migration 193 
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came during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from Cuyo and Agutaya, islands 194 
lying to the northeast of Palawan Island (Eder 2004). Since the 1950s and 1960s, migrants 195 
have increasingly settled from diverse locations around the country, particularly the central 196 
island group known as the Visayas, which includes major islands such as Cebu, Negros, 197 
Bohol, Leyte and Samar. This migration to Palawan coincided with a rapid expansion of 198 
fisheries production in both the small-scale and commercial fishing sectors in Palawan, which 199 
rapidly became one of the leading sources of fish in the country (Butcher 2004). 200 
Recently, the coastal regions of the province have experienced a further intensification of 201 
different types of fisheries trade. For example, investments from East Asia beginning in the 202 
late 1980s and increasing rapidly from the 2000s have led to Palawan being the national 203 
centre for the lucrative trade in live reef food fish, exported to China to meet growing middle 204 
class demand (Fabinyi 2012). Other important international seafood exports from Palawan 205 
include chilled groupers, sea cucumbers, squid and crustaceans. Major commercial fisheries 206 
operating in Palawan waters include purse seines for tuna, liftnet boats for scads and 207 
anchovies, and large-scale net fishing and spearfishing boats for mixed reef fish. Flanking 208 
and penetrating the coastal areas now is the spread of mining and boom crop expansion (Eder 209 
& Evangelista 2014). At the same time, public and private actors are heavily promoting 210 
coastal tourism, with significant public and private investments in airports, hotels and other 211 
tourism infrastructure. And tourism expansion is closely linked to the expansion of 212 
environmental conservation in both marine and terrestrial spaces (Fabinyi 2010; Dressler 213 
2011). In all of these sectors, control over natural resources is heavily contested by multiple 214 
actors with different visions of the frontier. Palawan’s coastal frontier is thus rapidly filling in 215 
with diverse actors who live in the same spaces and compete over access to new lucrative 216 
forms of marine resource use.  217 
FIGURE 1: PALAWAN PROVINCE, PHILIPPINES 218 
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4.2 Social Relations 219 
In the coastal areas of Palawan, social relations of class1 and ethnicity2 have played a vital 220 
role in coastal peoples’ capacity to negotiate access and use marine resources. Settlement 221 
patterns in Palawan intersected with long-established ethnic categories and the social 222 
relations that influenced claims over access to and use of land and coastal resources.  223 
Spanish and American colonial regimes helped construct the social binaries of lowlanders 224 
and uplanders that affected social ties, networks and trade dynamics. As the Spaniards first 225 
began proselytization among lowland peoples they faced difficulty converting others who 226 
upheld their own custom by living in, or retreating to, the uplands. Social discrimination and 227 
divisions reinforced subsequent social divisions and hierarchies between ‘advanced’ 228 
Christian lowlanders and ‘primitive’ tribal uplanders along socio-spatial lines (see Abinales, 229 
2000; Dressler 2009). Along the coastal plains, lowlanders were cast as productive farmers in 230 
line with the state, and Church, whereas uplanders were cast as pagan and backward. The 231 
coastal poor often tended to be Christian, but there were also those ‘in the middle’, whose 232 
ethnicity and class position was varied and constituted from different social groups who 233 
progressively filled in the coastal zone. Indeed, since their colonial inception, these broader 234 
categories tended to belie significant ethno-linguistic diversity across the islands. Yet while 235 
the blurring of ethnic categories continues to unfold, the veneer of constructed categories 236 
                                                          
1 While noting that ‘class’ is complex with myriad influences (Kerkvliet 1990; Eder 2009), we privilege a 
definition of class as socio-economically constituted through relations of production and exchange, based on 
access to and use of natural resources (fish), assets (fishing gear, land etc) and income (from fisheries, farming, 
wage labour, remittances) (Wright 2005).  
2 Although significant ethnic diversity exists among migrant groups (Eder 2004), our use of ethnicity is meant to 
highlight the broader socio-political and cultural differences between indigenous (Tagbanua) and migrant 
groups. We argue that ethnicity rests in the experiences of social life and differential access to opportunities that 
groups in power control and exploit (Wilmsen, 1989). The process by which groups identify as indigenous 
reflects a ‘positioning’ (Li, 2000: 151), which draws upon the meanings and context of struggles against the 




harden and take on greater socio-political significance through contested claims over access 237 
to natural resources.  238 
Our main focus is on coastal residents that come from a wide variety of locations across the 239 
Philippines. Access to productive resources is relatively unfettered for longer-term residents 240 
of the same group, where group membership is defined by ethnolinguistic traits, common 241 
(blood) lineage, and length of residency. Outsider access to and use of resources claimed by 242 
another group are weakest among new arrivals with different ethnolinguistic backgrounds 243 
(Dressler 2009; Knudsen 2012). However, access and use rights—and the institutions 244 
influencing them—are seldom ‘closed’ definitively. Those outsiders who form social 245 
relations with neighbouring groups, through marriage or labour relations, eventually secure 246 
new social and economic opportunities (Dressler & Fabinyi 2011).    247 
In many coastal and upland areas livelihood dynamics overlap, unsettling older social 248 
divisions between upland farmer and coastal fisher (Pido 1995; Eder 2003). Many households 249 
living along the coastal-upland gradient will turn to clear plots near or on the coast, where 250 
proximity generates new access opportunities in fisheries. In Palawan, many farmers who 251 
face declining crop yields work social networks to adopt fishing as a supplemental activity 252 
and then perhaps fulltime, stating it produces money more quickly than the low yields of 253 
upland areas (Dressler & Fabinyi 2011). However, the more (indigenous or otherwise) upland 254 
farmers move to the coast amidst Visayan fishers, the potential for competition over scarce 255 
resources increases between contrasting ethnic groups. The following section explores in 256 
detail the different ways in which households in San Vicente have been able to access 257 
fisheries trade in terms of class and ethnicity, and then discusses examples of fisheries 258 
exclusions.  259 
5. LOCAL SCALE 260 
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5.1 Class relations, ethnicity and access to fisheries 261 
In San Vicente there are a range of small pelagic and demersal fish (e.g. scads, ponyfish, 262 
mackerel) that are caught and traded within the Philippines. Squid and live groupers are two 263 
export fisheries that have expanded with significant investments from East Asian traders 264 
since the late 1990s  (Table 1).  265 
[Insert Table 1 here]. 266 
Table 1: Major fishing activities and patterns of trade in San Vicente, Philippines. 267 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork 2014-2015.  268 
Access to and use of capital for fishing is differentiated in terms of class and ethnicity. We 269 
discuss lesser to greater degrees of differentiation and show how migrant and indigenous 270 
fisher families work social relations to access and use capital for fishing. Table 2 provides a 271 
sketch of the three different classes we discuss. The terms ‘more recent migrants’ and ‘settled 272 
migrants’ are overlapping categories but refer broadly to periods marking the first period of 273 
intense migration to San Vicente from the 1950s through to the 1970s, and those that came 274 
afterwards. More important than the specific date of arrival, however, is whether they have 275 
been able to establish over time assets such as land and productive social relations.  276 
[Insert Table 2 here] 277 
Table 2: Class and ethnic differentiation in San Vicente, Palawan.  278 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork 2014-2015 279 
5.1.1 Lower class 280 
The poorest, lower income households are fishers with few or no capital assets (see Table 1). 281 
Typically residing in beach or foreshore areas with no formal tenure, these fishers will use 282 
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hook and line or other simple gears on small, simple boats without engine, fishing for hours 283 
at a time in calmer inshore waters. Start-up costs are minimal, ranging from USD21-42, and 284 
average trips will cost only USD2-4. On these trips they will likely only catch between 5-285 
10kg of lower-value fish such as threadfin bream (Nemipterus) that are sold at USD0.50-286 
1.60/kg. Others in a similar situation will work as crewmembers for other larger boats, and 287 
will obtain a much smaller share of the profits compared to boat-owners. Such poorer 288 
households will however occasionally retain swidden plots (.25 - .5 ha) further in the uplands, 289 
often far removed from flatter more productive paddy rice lands (claimed by tenured 290 
migrants) already occupying most if not all arable lowland areas.   291 
These households will either be very recent poor arrivals co-residing with other poor Visayan 292 
fishers, or indigenous Tagbanua. In time, a shared sense of poverty and experiences of 293 
hardship among Tagbanua and Visayan fishers may develop and center on collective self-294 
identification as katutubo – or being indigenous, innate – particularly in the context of 295 
intermarriage. Living with degrees of reciprocity, sharing experiences, and learning from one 296 
another, these families place less emphasis on difference than commonality, though social 297 
differences are often still articulated through contrasting material culture and social behaviour 298 
(Dressler & Turner, 2008). They own few significant material assets and so rely heavily on 299 
their own labour and social networks to secure marine products. In both communities we 300 
studied, their households cluster together in the same hamlets. As elsewhere in Palawan, 301 
Tagbanua especially are significantly marginalised, with considerable levels of poverty in 302 
each community we worked in. While initial livelihoods have lower levels of diversification, 303 
particularly for younger or older-aged households, the suite of diversification expands as a 304 
risk spreading and coping strategy.  305 
A key means by which people in this notional class position begin to access the fisheries 306 
trade is by way of networked social relations: immediate family, other relatives, neighbours 307 
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and friends are vitally important in acting as the means by which households can access the 308 
capital and support to enter into a fishing operation (e.g. Seki 2004). Nathan, for example, 309 
was a maize farmer who left Quezon province due to violence with insurgent groups, and 310 
migrated to San Vicente in 1986. His cousins and uncles had already arrived some time 311 
earlier, and were a crucial socio-economic lifeline when he first arrived. His relatives 312 
provided him with employment options on a net fishing boat, where he then worked for the 313 
first several years after arrival. After some years of gradually building up savings, he was 314 
able to buy his own net, again with support from a small loan from his relatives. He now 315 
owns two boats, fishing regularly on one with his son. He hires the other out to neighbours, 316 
and receives 50% of the profits. Social networks are thus a key means to access fisheries, 317 
especially for recent migrants. Yet as Nathan’s experiences indicate, it takes a long time to 318 
successfully transition to a notionally higher-class position with potentially more income and 319 
assets. Crucially, those Tagbanua and poorer Visayans without strong social networks will be 320 
excluded from these means of production and the prospect of greater wealth generation.  321 
5.1.2 Middle class 322 
Moderately poor, middle-income fisher households will own a boat with an engine: using 323 
bottom-set gillnets and driftnets for the capture of small pelagic fish, using squid jigs to 324 
capture squid, or hook and line to capture live grouper. Start-up costs for these sorts of boats 325 
will be between USD1500-4300, and trip costs will range from less than USD5 to more than 326 
USD60 (Table 1). The returns from fishing with these more technologically advanced boats 327 
are also greater – fishers are able to capture greater numbers of pelagic fish in the case of 328 
nets, or higher-value products in the case of boats with engines fishing for live grouper and 329 
squid.  330 
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Households with these boats will often rent them out, and may gradually capitalise their 331 
enterprise with new technology and boat crew. Such households have a broader repertoire of 332 
livelihood activities that tend to be more capital dependent, and are more likely to hold 333 
formal land title that is under intensified commercial agriculture (e.g. paddy rice). They are 334 
predominantly settled migrants, and tend to co-mingle more with other migrants and less so 335 
with indigenous peoples. 336 
Fishers may transition from a notionally lower to middle class position over the course of a 337 
working life, as with Nathan, or they may obtain credit from local traders. In particular, this is 338 
common in fishing for live grouper, because many of the traders in San Vicente are agents of 339 
fish exporters based in Manila (who receive funding from companies in Hong Kong or 340 
China), and thus have the capital to extend credit. The extent of financing can include capital 341 
to go on a fishing trip (USD60 for fuel and supplies for several days at sea), or even the entire 342 
boat and engine (USD1500-4300). Traders will sometimes provide fishers not only with the 343 
capital required to go fishing, but also with financial support for personal expenses, 344 
especially during periods of financial difficulty or bad weather.  345 
Garnering close social ties amongst wealthier fishers and financers facilitates such access 346 
opportunities (Ribot & Peluso 2003). Fishers have to invest in these relationships and build 347 
up trust with traders before they qualify for loans, as one trader noted: ‘we have to know the 348 
fisher well before we give them money for expenses, especially if we give them capital for a 349 
boat and engine. Too many fishers just don’t pay the money back or give their fish to other 350 
traders, so we have to be careful’. Rodrigo, for example, was a fisher who owned his own 351 
boat and engine, but lacked the capital to go on fishing trips for live grouper. Through 352 
financing from a live grouper trader based in town – introduced to him by a neighbour who 353 
was already being financed by this trader – he was able to use his boat for regular live 354 
grouper fishing trips from 2003, and subsequently gain more income. Without this financing, 355 
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he claimed, he would be forced to do fishing activities with a much lower return: as he did 356 
not have the capital to buy a net, he would otherwise be using hook and line for small 357 
quantities of lower-valued fish such as threadfin bream. There is no formal interest on these 358 
loans by traders to fishers, but fishers who are financed receive a lower price for their fish 359 
than those who are not. Successful fishers use these loans to establish themselves as 360 
independent fishers and are able to move out of financing, but other, less successful fishers 361 
end up burdened by mounting debts.  362 
5.1.3 Upper class 363 
Wealthier, upper income fishers –the notional ‘upper class’–are those who own several or 364 
many smaller boats, or one or more larger ring-net fishing boats, and may either be long term 365 
residents or more recent arrivals with existing wealth. Start-up costs for the boats and 366 
equipment required to do ring-net fishing are from USD21,000- 43,000, and such vessels will 367 
catch between several hundred kgs and two tonnes of small pelagic fish on a single fishing 368 
trip of several hours. Owners of these boats obtain very high returns from such fishing, which 369 
has the highest catch-per-unit-effort of all the fisheries in San Vicente (Palawan State 370 
University [PSU] 2011). Crews for these boats will usually be chosen from relatives, 371 
neighbours and friends of the owner, which means that poorer Tagbanua and Visayan fishers 372 
can struggle to negotiate the more distal social relations necessary to participate in this more 373 
lucrative fishery.  374 
Upper income households include long-term settled households that have built up significant 375 
assets over time, including various land-based assets (multiple hectares of cash crops, 376 
livestock, variety stores etc). Many are descendants of early migrants who were able to claim 377 
private title over land. Evelyn, for example, was a live fish trader whose parents were among 378 
the first settlers to her village in 1955, arriving from Cuyo. They acquired land at this time, 379 
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while also selling anchovies to itinerant traders from Manila. Using the profits from this 380 
trading practice they were able to ensure Evelyn received an education, and by the early 381 
2000s she was working with a large fish trading company in the provincial capital Puerto 382 
Princesa. She used the savings from this work to start her own live fish trading enterprise 383 
with her husband in San Vicente in 2006. Their profitable enterprise now employs eight 384 
employees and finances the operations of 30 boats. Other upper income households may be 385 
more recent migrants that have migrated with existing wealth. Marivel, for example, grew up 386 
in Bohol in the Visayas, and found work assisting in the management of a fishing company. 387 
She married a Taiwanese fishing captain, and together with capital from her husband’s buyers 388 
in Taiwan, they set up a squid trading operation in San Vicente in 1993. They currently 389 
finance about 200 boats and ship tens of tonnes of squid each year. Few, if any, very poor 390 
Tagbanua or Visayan fishers will influence how better off fishing households use their capital 391 
and overall returns on catches in these areas. And none will have any clear rights over such 392 
capital.  393 
5.2 Fisheries exclusions  394 
In this section we work with the counter-point of access, exclusion, to provide illustrative 395 
examples of how access is differentiated in practice among the different classes of fishers 396 
described in the previous section. We adapt Hall et al.’s (2011) notion of ‘four powers of 397 
exclusion’ (regulation, the market, force3 and legitimation) to highlight how they provide 398 
windows into the forms of societal changes and social relations described in earlier sections 399 
of the paper.  400 
5.2.1 Regulation 401 
                                                          
3 While violence is not uncommon in many other parts of the rural Philippines, force is not a major feature in 
everyday life of San Vicente, so we have not included it here.  
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Regulation of fisheries has a direct effect on influencing access dynamics in the coastal zone 402 
of San Vicente, with differentiated outcomes. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, 403 
Eder (2009: 113-114) describes how the introduction of marine protected areas in San 404 
Vicente negatively impacted poorer fishers more than they impacted richer ones. Because 405 
many MPAs were created close to shore, the fishing grounds of asset poor fishers—those at 406 
the margins of subsistence— were most heavily affected. Without an engine, fishers in 407 
smaller paddle boats had to stay nearer to shore and a larger proportion of their fishing 408 
grounds were impacted by MPA enclosures.   409 
More recently in 2014 the municipal government has banned beach seining. Beach seining 410 
involved laying out a large seine net in the shallow waters and then hauling it in to catch 411 
various small fish. While the net owners were heavily impacted by the ban, the ban had a 412 
disproportionate effect on the poorest fishers and members of the community because of the 413 
distinctive fishing method of beach seining. Many poorer members of the community – those 414 
without regular fishing income, the elderly, women and children – would gather whenever a 415 
beach seine was being layed and help to haul it in. As the haul was brought in, these extra 416 
workers would take fish away for their efforts. Although these workers were uninvited, the 417 
taking of fish was tolerated and seen as benefitting the wider community (see also Segi 418 
2014b). Poorer residents who gained access to fish in this way would then use these fish for 419 
their own consumption, or sell them locally. Banning beach seining, therefore, has meant 420 
excluding access to fisheries for the poorest and most marginalised fishers in the community. 421 
A second piece of regulation recently introduced is the introduction of licence fees and 422 
registrations for municipal fishers. The goals of this regulation including ensuring that 423 
residents of San Vicente are the only ones who can fish in municipal waters, and to generate 424 
wider revenue for the local government. Permit fees for gears, fishing vessels and the use of 425 
marine waters for seaweed farms were introduced, ranging from two USD upwards to tens of 426 
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dollars depending on the gear and vessel type. Penalties for breaking these regulations were 427 
introduced in the form of fines (USD32 for a first offence). Other regulations recently 428 
introduced since late 2014 include tightening the rules surrounding the live reef food fishery, 429 
specifically: new minimum and maximum fish size limits, a closed season and a ban on the 430 
‘grow-out’ of juvenile fish. These regulations have had highly socially differentiated 431 
outcomes on fishing effort and incomes: poorer fishers with fewer savings have been affected 432 
the most. For example, some poorer fishers reported being unable to pay the license fees. The 433 
new restrictions on live fish fishing meant that boat owners and crews who rely on fishing for 434 
live fish during the period of the closed season would be forced to shift to other, less lucrative 435 
fisheries such as threadfin bream. In particular, crewmembers in the live fish fishery tend to 436 
already be among the poorest members of the community, and any reduction in income 437 
would intensify their poverty. From this perspective, the impacts of fisheries regulations have 438 
reinforced existing inequalities.   439 
5.2.2 The market 440 
The high growth in seafood prices, especially for squid and live reef food fish, has been for 441 
many fishers a type of maritime ‘boom crop’ (Hall et al. 2011) that has in the short term 442 
benefitted them greatly. The primary direct barrier to access these forms of seafood is simply 443 
one of capital: those fishers with higher levels of capital and who own their boat are able to 444 
obtain a far greater share of the profits than those who simply crew on the boat. Importantly, 445 
as fisheries become more capital-intensive (e.g. ring-net fishing), the profit-sharing systems 446 
change to favour owners over crewmembers more (Fabinyi et al. 2016). Those without 447 
capital are effectively excluded from the highest levels of profit from these lucrative fisheries.  448 
More indirect, however, are exclusions related to the high increase in value of another 449 
market: land. In recent years local, provincial and national governments in the Philippines 450 
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have invested heavily in coastal tourism, seeing it as an opportunity to generate economic 451 
growth and employ fishers and farmers. However, as documented in central and northern 452 
Palawan (Fabinyi 2010; Dressler 2011), the potential of incorporating the poor into tourism 453 
production is diminished when property values (and other commodity costs) nearest to the 454 
coast increase to constrain local access. In particular, speculation can cause the value of 455 
coastal lands to increase dramatically to such a level that those poor, lower income Visayan 456 
and Tagbanua fishers without formal land rights (and other assets) are easily evicted to make 457 
way for new, exclusive tourism infrastructure. As a consequence, poorer Visayan and 458 
Tagbanua fishers may retreat inland or relocate to another less appealing coastal area that 459 
make fishing livelihoods far more difficult. In contrast, those wealthier fishers with larger 460 
boats and private land holdings have greater potential to use these assets to benefit from the 461 
development of tourism (e.g., taking tourists out on tours, changing homes into hostels etc.). 462 
Along the 14.7 km ‘Long Beach’ in San Vicente, property speculation has seen powerful 463 
local politicians and others investing considerable sums of money to purchase lands for 464 
anticipated tourism arrivals – according to the municipal tourism plan, annual arrivals will 465 
increase to 50,000 by 2021, 500,000 by 2029 and 1 million by 2044. The official website 466 
(www.sanvicente.com.ph) notes that Long Beach is ‘eyed by many tourists, investors and 467 
analysts to be the next Boracay of the Philippines, the next Bali of Asia […].’ Cleared lands 468 
along the main beach and nearby have already been purchased by major property 469 
development companies such as Robinsons for the anticipated development of hotels, resorts 470 
and shopping malls. New infrastructure investment also includes the development of an 471 
international airport, developed to facilitate tourism. Many of these lands have been literally 472 
fenced off, advertising exclusion, partly denying poor fishers access to marine resources. 473 
Among the Tagbanua, Visayan and Agutaynen, coastal occupants and users have either sold 474 
their lands for marginal sums (compared to current property values) of money or have been 475 
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marginalized due to direct land sales for future tourism developments, reinforcing their social 476 
position. Although widespread evictions are not yet present, those without secure tenure are 477 
vulnerable.  478 
5.2.3 Legitimation 479 
Legitimation works through each of the other exclusionary powers to justify their symbolic 480 
and moral appeal (Hall et al. 2011: 18). The push for tourism in the coastal Philippines, for 481 
example, relies on state, municipal and private sector rhetoric that it will bring economic 482 
benefits and prosperity for local residents. Tourism is depicted in policy documents of local, 483 
provincial and national governments of the Philippines – as well as by environmental NGOS, 484 
and in much of the marine conservation literature – as a positive economic activity that can 485 
generate income, employment and sustainable livelihoods for coastal residents (e.g. Alcala 486 
and Russ 2006). In many ways, the major push behind coastal tourism development is to 487 
effectively expedite the modernization of rural areas and fishers. Indeed, in the Philippines 488 
small-scale fisheries are frequently represented as a low-status occupation, characterised by 489 
poverty, hardship and over-exploitation of the resource base (Fabinyi 2012). By extension, 490 
fishers are often represented as ignorant, destructive and in need of regulation (Segi 2014a).  491 
Moreover, the discourse and truth value of fisheries science is a key means by which fisheries 492 
regulations are legitimised. Appeals to the sustainability of fisheries stocks were cited as key 493 
reasons for the newer regulations introduced since 2014. The new regulations on the live reef 494 
fish trade, for example, cite the need ‘to save, protect and conserve the degrading marine 495 
resources’ in order to ‘save the industry and its stakeholders from collapse and displacement’ 496 
(Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 2014). Similarly, the earlier MPA initiatives 497 
of the late 1990s were largely driven by environmental science (Arquiza 1999). More 498 
broadly, Palawan has long promoted an image as being the ‘last ecological frontier’ and as 499 
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pro-environment (Dressler 2011). While these legitimations do not imply that interventions 500 
aren’t needed from an environmental sustainability perspective, it does mean that social and 501 
political impacts of new environmental regulations can be downplayed. The technical, expert 502 
knowledge deployed by local, provincial and governing organisations typically reflects the 503 
‘will to improve’ (Li 2007), eliding questions of politics and power.  504 
Legitimations are always contested, however (Hall et al. 2011: 18-19), and this is also seen in 505 
San Vicente. After the ban on beach seining came into effect, owners and fishers of beach 506 
seines sent a petition to local and provincial political representatives. Similarly, live fish 507 
traders organised to protest the imposition of the closed season. While the beach seining 508 
petition was unsuccessful, live fish traders succeeded in delaying the implementation of the 509 
closed season.  510 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 511 
While much recent scholarly attention has focused on land-based frontier change—with 512 
significant focus on land grabs and boom crop production (see Borras et al. 2011; Peluso and 513 
Lund 2011; Fairhead et al. 2012)—our paper has examined similar manifestations in coastal 514 
frontiers. These changes are increasingly linked to the production of marine commodities and 515 
the claiming of capital and seascapes that are associated with increasing demand for imported 516 
seafood from across the region (Fougères 2008; Fabinyi 2012; ADB 2014; Eriksson et al. 517 
2015). The intersection of the intensifying fisheries trade and local social relations in context 518 
strongly informs the political economy of who gets what, how much they get, and what they 519 
do with things (Bernstein 2010); effectively, the essence of access (Ribot & Peluso 2003).  520 
Palawan is a notional ‘frontier’ where many recent migrants move to the coast for livelihood 521 
opportunities. Investments in land and infrastructure for much anticipated tourism developing 522 
are unfolding, as migration continues and fisheries trade expands. Yet, the ability of fishers to 523 
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access the wealth generated by this fisheries trade varies considerably. Those with existing 524 
wealth can use it to successfully access new fisheries opportunities such as the live fish trade. 525 
In contrast, relying on their own labour and limited capital, poorer Visayan fishers work on 526 
boats without engines or as crewmembers, experiencing low returns on their investments, 527 
which keeps them in a vulnerable position. Indigenous Tagbanua fishers with greater access 528 
to their own and kin-held usufruct land in upland areas, but equally poor, also try their luck to 529 
access more lucrative fishing opportunities but often have more distal social relations to 530 
negotiate. These social relations often secure the access to and use of capital and technology 531 
that is needed to ensure successful seafood commodity production.   532 
More broadly, then, this paper has contributed a scaled political ecology approach to the often 533 
highly normative discussion surrounding the costs and benefits of expanding fisheries trade. 534 
Our contribution emphasizes how the micro-social dynamics of both access to and exclusion 535 
from the fisheries trade among indigenous and migrant coastal dwellers relates to the regional 536 
political economy of maritime frontiers. We argue that transformations taking place at a 537 
regional scale, such as increased tourism, migration and investments in fisheries, intersect 538 
with local-scale relations of class and ethnicity to generate specific access dynamics that 539 
heavily influence the social outcomes of expanding seafood trade. While access dynamics 540 
will vary depending on context, this scaled political ecology approach builds on existing 541 
accounts of fisheries trade to highlight the processes unfolding at multiple scales. From a 542 
policy perspective, such an approach highlights that the question is less about whether 543 
seafood trade is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ for coastal communities, and more about how such 544 
expanding trade interacts with particular social dynamics. It emphasises viewing the role and 545 
perspective of fishers not only in terms of formal ‘rights’ in relation to managing expanding 546 
fisheries trade – whether fishing rights or human rights (Allison et al. 2012) – but also more 547 
subtle notions of access and exclusion.  548 
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Furthermore, there are various factors that increase the importance of a conceptual focus on 549 
access and exclusion. While San Vicente fisheries so far have avoided the large-scale 550 
depletions charactersing much of the coastal Philippines, some fisheries are in decline (PSU 551 
2012), and this is a phenomenon widespread globally (Pauly and Zeller 2016). As the broader 552 
supply of marine resources become depleted and the ‘frontier closes’ (Butcher 2004), 553 
competition for control over these marine resources will likely intensify (Pomeroy et al. 554 
2007). As in terrestrial spaces, different land uses are intensifying near and within coastal 555 
spaces, particularly tourism infrastructure, squeezing out poorer residents of the coastal zone. 556 
Governance is also tightening, becoming a major driver of access dynamics in itself, and 557 
migration to the coastal zone continues. In the face of these growing constraints at the 558 
broader scale, social relations become key markers of difference that can harden and inform 559 
levels of authority over access to resources. As the pace of these changes increase with 560 
globalisation, such access dynamics will become more salient to understand social outcomes.  561 
7. REFERENCES  562 
Abinales, P. (2000) Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the 563 
Philippine Nation-State. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.   564 
Alcala, A. C., and Russ, G. R. (2006) No-take Marine Reserves and Reef Fisheries 565 
Management in the Philippines. Ambio 35(5): 245–254. 566 
Allison, EH, Ratner BD, Åsgård B, Willmann R, Pomeroy R, Kurien J. (2012) Rights-based 567 
Fisheries Governance: From Fishing Rights to Human Rights. Fish and Fisheries 13(1):14-568 
29. 569 
Arquiza, Y. (1999) Rhythm of the Sea. Coastal Environmental Profile of San Vicente, 570 
Palawan. Coastal Resource Management Project of the Department of Environment and 571 
Natural Resources: Cebu City.  572 
25 
 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). (2014) Economics of Fisheries and Aquaculture in the 573 
Coral Triangle. Asian Development Bank, Mandaluying City, Philippines.  574 
Barbesgaard, M. 2016. Blue growth: saviour or ocean grabbing?: 575 
https://www.tni.org/en/publication/blue-growth-saviour-or-ocean-grabbing. The Hague: 576 
Institute of Social Studies. 577 
Barney K (2009) Laos and the making of a ‘relational’ resource frontier. Geographical 578 
Journal, 175, 146–159. 579 
Belton B, Thilsted SH (2014) Fisheries in transition: Food and nutrition security implications 580 
for the global South. Global Food Security 3(1), 59-66. 581 
Béné C, Lawton R, Allison, E (2010) “Trade matters in the fight against poverty”: Narratives, 582 
perceptions, and (lack of) evidence in the case of fish trade in Africa. World Development 38 583 
(7), 933-954. 584 
Béné C, Arthur R, Norbury H, Allison EH, Beveridge M, Bush S, Campling L, Leschen W, 585 
Little D, Squires D, Thilsted SH, Troell M, Williams M (2016) Contribution of Fisheries and 586 
Aquaculture to Food Security and Poverty Reduction: Assessing the Current Evidence. World 587 
Development 79, 177-196. 588 
Bernard HR (2006) Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 589 
Approaches. Lanham, MD: Altamira Press. 590 
Bernstein H (2010) Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change. Halifax, Canada: Fernwood Press.  591 
Berry S (1989) Social institutions and access to resources. Africa 59, 41-55. 592 
Borras S, Hall R, Scoones I, White B, Wolford W (2011) Towards a better understanding of 593 
global land grabbing: an editorial introduction. Journal of Peasant Studies 38(2), 209-216. 594 
26 
 
Butcher, J (2004) The Closing of the Frontier. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 595 
Singapore.  596 
Campling, L. (2012) The tuna ‘commodity frontier’: Business strategies and environment in 597 
the industrial tuna fisheries of the Western Indian Ocean. Journal of Agrarian Change 12(2-598 
3): 252-278.  599 
Campling, L., E. Havice and P. Howard. (2012) The political economy and ecology of 600 
capture fisheries: market dynamics, resource access and relations of exploitation and 601 
resistance. Journal of Agrarian Change 12(2-3): 177-203.  602 
Cinner JE, Graham NAJ, Huchery C, MacNeil AM. (2013) Global effects of local human 603 
population density and distance to markets on the condition of coral reef fisheries. 604 
Conservation Biology 27(3), 453–458. 605 
Crona B., Basurto X, Squires D, Gelcich S, Daw TM, Khan A, Havice E, Chomo V, Troell 606 
M, Buchary EA, Allison. EH. (2016) Towards a typology of interactions between small-scale 607 
fisheries and global seafood trade. Marine Policy 65: 1-10. 608 
Coe N, Dicken P, Hess M (2008) Global production networks: realizing the potential. Journal 609 
of Economic Geography 8, 271–295. 610 
Coulthard S (2011) More than just access to fish: the pros and cons of fisher participation in a 611 
customary marine tenure (Padu) system under pressure. Marine Policy 35, 405–412. 612 
Dressler WH (2009) Old Thoughts in New Ideas: State Conservation Measures, Development 613 
and Livelihood on Palawan Island. Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City.  614 
Dressler W (2011) First to third nature: The rise of capitalist conservation on Palawan island, 615 
the Philippines. Journal of Peasant Studies 38 (3), 533-557. 616 
27 
 
Dressler WH, Fabinyi M. (2011) Farmer gone fish’n? Swidden decline and the rise of 617 
grouper fishing on Palawan Island, Philippines. Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (4), 536-55.  618 
Dressler W, Turner S (2008) The Persistence of Social Differentiation in the Philippine 619 
Uplands. Journal of Development Studies, 44 (10), 1450-1473. 620 
Eder JF (2003) Of fishers and farmers: Ethnicity and resource use in coastal Palawan. 621 
Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society 31, 207–225. 622 
Eder JF (2004) Who are the Cuyonon? Ethnic Identity in the Modern Philippines. Journal of 623 
Asian Studies 63(3), 625-647. 624 
Eder JF (2009) Migrants to the Coasts: Livelihood, Resource Management, and Global 625 
Change in the Philippines. Cengage Learning: Wadsworth. 626 
Eder JF, Evangelista OL (2015) Palawan and its Global Networks. Ateneo de Manila 627 
University Press: Quezon City.  628 
Eriksson H, Österblom H, Crona B, Troell M, Andrew N, Wilen J, Folke C (2015) 629 
Contagious exploitation of marine resources.  Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 13, 630 
435-440. 631 
Fabinyi M (2010) The Intensification of Fishing and the Rise of Tourism. Human Ecology 632 
38(3), 415-427.  633 
Fabinyi M (2012) Fishing for Fairness: Poverty, Morality and Marine Resource Regulation 634 
in the Philippines. ANU Press, Canberra.  635 
Fabinyi M, W Dressler, Pido M. (2016) Do fish scales matter? Diversification and 636 
differentiation in seafood commodity chains. Ocean and Coastal Management 134: 103-111.  637 
28 
 
Fairhead J, Leach M, Scoones I. (2012) Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of 638 
nature? Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2) 237-261. 639 
Foley P, E Havice. (2016) The rise of territorial eco-certifications: New politics of 640 
transnational sustainability governance in the fishery sector. Geoforum 69: 24-33. 641 
Fougères D (2008) Aquarian Capitalism and Transition in Indonesia. VDM Verlag Dr. 642 
Mueller e.K, Germany. 643 
Gephart JA, Pace ML (2015) Structure and evolution of the global seafood trade network. 644 
Environmental Research Letters 10, 12.  645 
Hall D, Hirsch P, Li, TM. (2011) Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia. 646 
University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu.   647 
Haller T, Merten S (2008) “We are Zambians, Don't tell us how to fish!” Human Ecology 648 
36(5), 699-715. 649 
Hicks CC, Cinner JE (2014) Social, institutional, and knowledge mechanisms mediate 650 
diverse ecosystem service benefits from coral reefs. Proceedings of the National Academy of 651 
Sciences: www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1413473111.  652 
Jentoft S, Eide A (eds). (2011) Poverty Mosaics: Realities and Prospects in Small-Scale 653 
Fisheries. Netherlands, Springer.  654 
Kerkvliet BJ (1990) Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a 655 
Central Luzon Village. University of California Press, Berkeley (CA). 656 
Knudsen M (2012) Fishing families and cosmopolitans in conflict over land on a Philippine 657 
Island. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43(3), 478-499. 658 
Knudsen M (2016) Poverty and Beyond. Human Ecology 44(3), 341-352. 659 
29 
 
Kurien J (2005) Responsible Fish Trade and Food Security. FAO Fisheries technical paper 660 
no. 456. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome. 102pp. 661 
Li TM (2000) Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia. Comparative Studies in Society 662 
and History. 41(1), 149-179.  663 
Li TM (2007) The Will to Improve. Duke University Press, Durham.  664 
Li TM (2014) Land’s End: Capitalist Relations on an Indigenous Frontier. Duke University 665 
Press, Durham.  666 
Longo S, Clausen R, Clark B. (2015) The Tragedy of the Commodity: Oceans, Fisheries and 667 
Aquaculture. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.   668 
Mansfield B (2011a) “Modern” industrial fisheries and the crisis of overfishing. In Peet, R., 669 
P. Robbins, M. Watts (eds), Global Political Ecology. London and New York: Routledge, pp 670 
84-99.  671 
Moore J (2015) Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the accumulation of capital. 672 
London and New York: Verso.  673 
Muallil R, Mamauag SS, Cabral RB, Celeste-Dizon EO, Aliño PM (2014) Status, trends and 674 
challenges in the sustainability of small-scale fisheries in the Philippines. Marine Policy 44, 675 
212-221.   676 
Natale F, Borrello A, Motova A (2015) Analysis of the determinants of international seafood 677 
trade using a gravity model. Marine Policy 60, 98-106.  678 
Neumann RP (2009) Political ecology: theorizing scale. Progress in Human Geography 33 679 
(3), 398-406.  680 
30 
 
Peluso NL, Lund C (2011) New frontiers of land control: Introduction. Journal of Peasant 681 
Studies, 38(4), 667-681. 682 
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (2014) Guidelines for the Regulation and 683 
Monitoring of Catching, Culture, Trade, Transport and Export of Reef-Fish-For-Food 684 
in Palawan. Available online at https://pcsd.gov.ph/igov/2017/08/14/revised-pcsd-685 
administrative-order-no-05-series-2014/  686 
Palawan State University (2011) Strengthening Governance and Sustainability of Small-Scale 687 
Fisheries Management in the Philippines: An Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management 688 
Approach (Phase 2). Region 4B – San Vicente, Palawan Component. Project report. Puerto 689 
Princesa City.  690 
Paulson S, Gezon L (eds) (2005) Political ecology across spaces, scales, and social groups. 691 
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  692 
Pauly D, Zeller D (2016) Catch reconstructions reveal that global marine fisheries catches are 693 
higher than reported and declining. Nature Communications 7, 10244.  694 
Perreault T, Bridge G, McCarthy J (eds). 2015. The Routledge Handbook of Political 695 
Ecology. London: Routledge.  696 
Pido MD (1995) The application of rapid rural appraisal techniques in coastal resources 697 
planning: Experience in Malampaya Sound, Philippines. Ocean and Coastal Management 698 
26(1), 57-72. 699 
Pinkerton, E., & Davis, R. (2015) Neoliberalism and the politics of enclosure in North 700 
American small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy, 61, 303-312. 701 
31 
 
Pomeroy R, Parks J, Pollnac R, Campson T, Genio E, Marlessy C, Holle E, Pido M, Nissapa 702 
A, Boromthanarat S, Hue NT (2007) Fish wars: Conflict and collaboration in fisheries 703 
management in Southeast Asia. Marine Policy 31(6), 645-56. 704 
Rasmussen, MG, Lund, C (2017) Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The territorialization of 705 
resource control. World Development https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.01.018  706 
Ribot JC (1998) Theorizing access: Forest profits along Senegal’s charcoal commodity 707 
Chain. Development and Change 29, 307-341 708 
Ribot J, Peluso N (2003) A theory of access. Rural Sociology, 68 (2), 153–81. 709 
Saguin, K. (2015) Blue Revolution in a Commodity Frontier. Journal of Agrarian Change 710 
16(4): 571-593. 711 
Segi S (2014a) Protecting or pilfering? Neoliberal conservationist marine protected areas in 712 
the experience of coastal Granada, the Philippines. Human Ecology 42(4): 565-575. 713 
Segi S (2014b.) “Losing at Sea, Winning on Land”: A Case Study of Philippine Small-Scale 714 
and Industrial Fisher Resource Competition. Society and Natural Resources 27: 1227-1241.  715 
Seki K (2004) Maritime migration in the Visayas: A case study of the Dalaguetenon 716 
fisherfolk in Cebu. In H. Umehara and G.M. Bautista (eds), Communities at the Margins: 717 
Reflections on Social, Economic and Environmental Change in the Philippines. Ateneo de 718 
Manila University Press, Quezon City. 719 
Swyngedouw E, Heynen NC (2003) Urban political ecology, justice and the politics of scale. 720 
Antipode 35(5): 898-918. 721 
Weeratunge N, Snyder KA, Sze CP (2010) Gleaner, fisher, trader, processor: Understanding 722 
gendered employment in fisheries and aquaculture. Fish and Fisheries 11, 405–420.  723 
32 
 
Wilmsen E. (1989) Land Filled with Flies. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  724 
Wright EO (2005) Foundations of a neo-Marxist class analysis. In Wright EO (ed), 725 


















and/or Puerto Princesa. When dried, they 










Bigfin Reef Squid 
(Sepioteuthis 
lessoniana) 
Fisher→Middleman→Agent of exporter in 
San Vicente→Puerto 













Small pelagic and 
demersal fish 
Fisher→Middleman→Roxas, Taytay 
and/or Puerto Princesa. When dried, they 









expenses for a 





Fisher→ Agent of exporter or local trader 






USD4260 USD6.4 per 
trip for an 
overnight trip. 
Small pelagic and 
demersal fish 
Fisher→Middleman→Roxas, Taytay 
and/or Puerto Princesa. When dried, they 









USD28 per trip 
for a trip of 
several hours.   
Small pelagic and 
demersal fish  
Fisher→Middleman→Roxas, Taytay 
and/or Puerto Princesa. When dried, they 
will reach Manila. 
200kg-2 
tonnes, 
                                                          
4 Costs were converted from Philipne Pesos (PHP) to US Dollars (USD). At the time of the last period of 






Table 1: Major fishing activities and patterns of trade in San Vicente, Philippines. 729 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork 2014-2015.  730 
 731 
 732 
Class Assets Ethnicity 
Lower  
 
Few household assets: minimal livestock, pales, buckets, machete; 
no formal land tenure. 
May own small dug-out, paddle-driven boat without an engine.  
Simple fishing gear: hook and line, squid jig.  
Start-up costs of USD21-42. 
 
More recent migrants 
(occasionally intermarried 
with Tagbanua) 
Tagbanua.   
Middle Some household assets: more livestock (some raised), de facto land 
tenure (tax declaration).  
Will own a small boat with an engine. 
In addition to hook and line, they will have more gear: bottom-set 
gillnet; driftnet.  




Upper Significant household assets: household appliances (e.g. television, 
concrete house). Usually will hold formal land title over their 
household land.   
Those also involved in farming will own more livestock including 
water buffalo; de jure land holding in lowland and uplands.  
May own a commercial size boat and expensive gear (e.g. ring-net) 
that employs crew of 10-20 (startup costs of USD20,000-40,000), or 
will own multiple smaller boats that fish for live fish, squid.  
Usually settled migrants, but 
also migrants with existing 
wealth.  
 733 
Table 2: Class and ethnic differentiation in San Vicente, Palawan.  734 
Source: Authors’ fieldwork 2014-2015 735 
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